By JAVED IQBAL
Once envisioned as the "steel frame" of governance inherited from colonial British India, Pakistan's bureaucracy has not only failed to replicate the institutional discipline seen across the border but is now corroding from within.
Instead of evolving, it has rusted—eroded by political interference, ad hoc appointments, and a culture of impunity. As career civil servants are sidelined in favour of politically backed outsiders and private-sector experiments, the very foundations of administrative integrity stand weakened. With performance benchmarks absent and accountability frameworks missing, calls are growing louder for a systemic overhaul that restores professionalism, merit, and purpose to what was once the backbone of the state.
The government’s growing tendency to appoint federal secretaries and heads of key public sector institutions from the private sector has sparked serious debate about the erosion of merit, the marginalisation of career civil servants, and the deepening governance crisis in Pakistan.
What began as an experiment to bring in fresh ideas and ‘corporate-style efficiency’ is now increasingly being seen as a desperate and directionless response to a chronically dysfunctional system run by bureaucracy.
At the heart of the problem lies a deeper malaise—a bureaucratic system designed more for survival than performance.
The Zaidi Fallout: Why FBR’s ‘game-changer’ was set up to fail Take the example of the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), where the appointment of Shabbar Zaidi, a well-known tax consultant from the private sector, was touted as a game-changer. But Zaidi's tenure ended in frustration and failure—not necessarily due to lack of capability, but because he was neither institutionally empowered nor systemically supported. The traditional bureaucratic machinery refused to 'accept' an outsider, and his hands remained tied by red tape, political constraints, and entrenched resistance within the FBR.
Different Faces, Same Failures: Why technocrats keep crashing and burning This is not an isolated case. Over the decades, several state-owned enterprises—Pakistan International Airlines (PIA), Pakistan Steel Mills, Pakistan Railways, and other business giants—have experimented with technocrats and private-sector experts at the helm. Yet, the results had been dismal. These institutions continue to bleed billions of rupees annually. One must ask: What guarantees success when institutional frameworks are flawed and targets are nonexistent? A federal secretary on anonymity said it would be easy to "use" private heads than grade 22 office holders.
Welcome to the No Accountability Zone: Why no one gets fired for failing?
At the heart of the problem lies a deeper malaise—a bureaucratic system designed more for survival than performance. In Pakistan, federal secretaries and senior officers are seldom held accountable for output. There are no performance targets, no clear KPIs, and no penalties for failure. This systemic inertia has turned the bureaucracy into a comfort zone for status-quo loyalists, not crusaders.
What Singapore and China Got Right—And Pakistan Gets Tragically Wrong
Contrast this with countries like Singapore and China, where bureaucracies are lean, disciplined, and target-driven. In Singapore, civil servants are competitively paid but ruthlessly assessed. Failure to deliver leads to removal, not merely reshuffling. In China, local administrators are promoted based on economic and social metrics tied to their jurisdictions. These are systems that recognise performance, not patronage.
On the other hand, Pakistan's civil servants are recruited through the rigorous Central Superior Services (CSS) examination. Yet, their role is being continuously undermined by politically motivated appointments both from inside and outside of the system. If the system of competitive recruitment is not trusted for leadership roles, why invest so heavily in it at all?
Merit vs. Networking: A system of connections over competence
Worse, the ad hoc nature of appointments further disturbs institutional continuity. Political governments seek quick results to satisfy external lenders like the IMF or to show cosmetic reforms, often placing technocrats in powerful positions without addressing the structural rot. These short-term fixes often prove to be zero-sum gains, offering little more than a change of face at the top.
Who’s Watching the Watchers?
The fundamental issue is not whether the private sector or public sector can deliver—it is the absence of an accountability framework. In a system where postings are influenced more by connections than credentials, and where rewards are not tied to results, how can anyone—insider or outsider—deliver meaningfully?
The arbitrary posting of ACs and DCs—arguably the most crucial revenue and administrative officers at the tehsil-district level—on political whims rather than merit has deeply eroded the credibility of the civil service. These appointments, often lacking clear administrative or revenue collection targets, render the position symbolic rather than functional.
The rise of 'clerks' with political connections to the coveted role of ACs reflects a shocking collapse of institutional checks, leaving many career officers sidelined despite competence and experience.
Equally troubling is the lack of a structured, performance-based promotion system within the bureaucracy. Inefficient and underperforming officers frequently elevate to grade 22, even becoming federal secretaries, purely due to political affiliations—not merit or achievement. It doesn’t only demoralise deserving officers but also perpetuates a culture of favoritism and mediocrity.
There is an urgent need to establish a Central Appointments and Accountability Commission (CAAC), a body composed of internationally reputed professionals, development experts, and civil society dignitaries—to oversee the appointment, performance, and removal of senior officers.
Global Models, Local Lessons
As mentioned above, Singapore and China showcase how effective bureaucracies can drive economic transformation, though through different models. Singapore relies on meritocracy, transparency, and competitive salaries, with strong anti-corruption measures and public trust. China emphasises performance, regional competition, and rapid development, rewarding GDP growth and stability. While Singapore focuses on precision and governance quality, China prioritises scale and speed. Both face challenges—Singapore with inequality and limited political openness, and China with bureaucratic inefficiencies and creativity constraints—but highlight the power of aligning bureaucracy with national goals.
Learning from China and Singapore, real bureaucratic reforms need clear job roles and performance goals for top government officials. Their work should be reviewed every year through a fair and open system. Appointments must be based on merit, not politics, and should include skilled people from both government and private sectors. Fixed terms can help stop political reshuffling. Promotions and contract renewals should depend on actual performance. Donor-led projects that focus on short-term conditions instead of long-term results should be avoided for lasting progress.
No More Experiments: Pakistan needs institutions, not whimsies
In conclusion, Pakistan cannot afford to run its critical institutions on experiments and personal whims. The civil service must be reformed, not sidelined. The private sector can be a partner, not a parachuter. Unless institutional mechanisms of accountability, transparency, and meritocracy are established, no appointment—regardless of pedigree—will deliver what Pakistan desperately needs: governance that works. To ensure merit, stability, and efficiency in governance, an independent body should be constituted to prepare objective rankings of officers for key positions, replacing political favoritism with performance-based appointments. A unified administrative service should replace fragmented cadres, with only Grade 20 and above officers eligible for federal postings to prevent arbitrary transfers, especially to conflict-prone regions like Balochistan as threat. The discretionary powers of Chief Ministers must be curtailed to uphold institutional autonomy, while inefficient officers should face compulsory retirement to maintain standards. Most critically, the bureaucracy must take initiative in establishing and empowering local governments, as their survival is essential for grassroots democracy and effective public service delivery.